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
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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch



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DIRECTION OF FRENCH COLLABORATIONIST THOUGHT: 1943



Description

A study of the characteristics of and alterations in French collaborationist opinion during 1943, with particular emphasis on Laval, Déat, Pétain and Doriot.

10 December 1943

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Summary

Sources of French collaboration, pre-1940. Aspects of collaborationist opinion, 1940-43. Attitude of Laval: possibility of attempted switch to Allies. Increasing opposition to Laval: opinions of some of his enemies. Uneasy alliance of Laval and Déat. Role of RNF. Déat's political intransigence. Pétain's current maneuvers: decline in his popularity and feelers toward United Nations; unsuccessful attempt to escape blame of collaboration. Doriot: his dislike of Laval and Déat, and his support of Marshal. Current status of PPF. Monarchist attitude toward Vichy. Rapid growth of disaffection. Revolt within France, and simultaneous exodus of terrified collaborationists from country. Policy of collaboration increasingly unpopular everywhere. Lack of parallel enthusiasm for United Nations. Need for Allied support of resistance movements. Implications of persistence into post-war period of present conflicts among the French.

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DIRECTION OF FRENCH COLLABORATIONIST THOUGHT: 1943

I. INTRODUCTION

In the years before World War II, the concept of political nationalism played the rôle of whipping-boy for the historians. For some, it served as peg for political theories or explanation of historical change; for others, it appeared to act as substitute for precision in thinking. To cite nationalism as a clue to European development had become, by 1939, virtually an academic cliché.

The defenders of uncontrolled nationalism were few in the democratic countries before the war. It remained for war itself appreciably to swell their ranks. At the present time, there are indications that a renaissance in political nationalism is on the way, both in Europe and in the United States. In part, this trend reflects the normal effects of war; in part, it mirrors, whether by intent or accident, the course of United Nations' policy.

France is an illustration in point. At first, the Armistice of June 1940 appeared wholly to have shattered French nationalist pride. Metropolitan France was divided roughly into three ideological groups: (1) those who accepted collaboration with enthusiasm and became more

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German than their conquerors; (2) those who accepted collaboration with degrees of reluctance, and tried through diplomatic means to maintain a measure of French autonomy; and (3) those who refused to accept defeat and continued to resist, whether within France or outside its borders.

Shifts of personnel and opinion among these three groups have been apparent recently. Most of the changes reported suggest a stiffening of resistance on all levels, and a heightened awareness of nationalist ambitions.

It is the purpose of this memorandum to evaluate these changes insofar as they concern the French included in the first two categories listed above, to judge the extent of present disaffection, and to decide, in conclusion, the significance of such disaffection in terms of United Nations' policy. The unveiling of potential Darlans will not be attempted.

II. COLLABORATIONIST THOUGHT

A. Background

The phenomenon of collaborationism in France emerged after the Armistice of June 1940. The roots of collaboration, however, go far back into the Third Republic. In contrast to those French who have always considered friendship with England prerequisite to adequate foreign

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policy, there have been others who continued to prefer a continental bloc. To the supporters of Germany and continental solidarity, World War II was, of course, an error.

During the closing months of 1940 and throughout the year that followed, the number of Germanophiles within France appeared to increase rapidly. The policy of collaboration, distasteful as it was to most of the French, produced a group of officials willing to work with the Germans, and provided these officials with ideological justification for their actions. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that all collaborators adhered to the "continental" theory, or were sudden converts to National Socialism. Many of them agreed to collaboration in the simple hope of saving their skins.

The collaborationist, emerged from whatever chrysalis, took on the common coloring of Fascism. Former allegiances and the vocabularies that went with them were quickly translated into the new political tongue. The most painless transformation was achieved by those who had long admired, whether openly or in private, the political, social, and economic system of the Nazis.

One of the most dangerous pre-war French attitudes was held by those whose mentality and taste inclined

toward Fascism, whether by choice or by default, but who were nevertheless able to remain outside actual Fascist circles. The high civil bureaucracy, for example, adapted itself with notable ease to the demands of collaboration. The bureaucrat was professionally scornful of parliamentary government, and weary of the vagaries of public opinion.¹ Fascism promised perpetual immunity from both complaints.

Another potential collaborationist was the French industrialist who, prior to 1939, had found it profitable to enter international combines and become a partner in European cartels. To this important segment of French industry, the future of the country's economy seemed predicated upon the maintenance of a "continental order."² Britain and Russia were traditionally suspect.

Easier to recognize than these semi-totalitarian opinions was the blatant Fascism of Marcel Bucard's Francist Party. Francisme, founded in 1933, was the only avowed Fascist party in France before the war. Bucard's aim in

1. See: Louis Franck, "The Forces of Collaboration", Foreign Affairs, October 1942.
2. See: Franck, op. cit., and Worms et Cie. (Revised), Economics Division (Secret) Report #2, COI, 3 March 1942.

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founding Francisme was to extirpate the parliamentary system, to free labor from the "egotistical spirit of industrial capitalism", and to create a highly centralized state free from all commercial and industrial functions. Anti-semitism, anti-Masonic activity, and anti-Communism were by-products of this policy; violence and invective¹ were its characteristics.

Although Francisme was officially terminated in 1936 with the dissolution of the "Fascist Leagues", Bucard and other Francistes continued to work for a totalitarian France. With the outbreak of war, Bucard pigeon-holed his opinions and enlisted. He was soon taken prisoner,² and interned in Switzerland.

The Armistice heralded the political revival of Marcel Bucard, and, by the same token, the re-birth of Francisme. No strategic changes were required either in the man or in the party. A few catch-words and slogans were altered, but the main symbols and prejudices had³ long since been firmly rooted.

1. French Basic Handbook (Secret), PID, Part I, p. 55. The Handbook is hereinafter cited as "FBH".
2. Bucard had fought in World War I, and used as campaign bait a picture of himself being decorated by Pétain at Verdun. There is some question as to the authenticity of the picture. (La Marseillaise, 25 October 1942.)
3. Francisme reappeared, with Pétain's approval, early in 1941. (FBH, Part III, p. 89.)

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Communism, and the fear of Communism, took a leading part in the development of collaboration. Vichy as well as the Germans stressed first the British and then the Bolshevik menace, thereby gaining the support of the cautious and the more easily terrified. Scarcely a day has passed since June 1941 without some official or semi-official attack upon the "Red menace." Since Communism is like a wine that does not travel well, the average Frenchman was forced to judge the Russians and their state on the basis of the French Communist Party (SFIC) before the war. It is no wonder that anti-Bolshevist propaganda has had a certain success.

Collaboration has lured not only the haters of Communism, but also some renegade members of the Party. The Russo-German pact of August 1939 had stirred the muddy waters of the SFIC to such an extent that Communist support of Hitler was not the impossibility it would have been a year before the Armistice. Jacques Doriot, former Communist leader, had left the Party rather abruptly in 1934, and was well on his way to being a major-league Fascist thug by the outbreak of war. Paul Marion, obscure left-wing Communist, followed Doriot out of the SFIC in 1934, and found his way into the Cabinet after the fall

¹
of Laval in 1940. Some run-of-the-mill Communists, such as Marcel Capron, tailored their ideologies to suit defeat, but had less spectacular success than Doriot or Marion. Many, particularly after the German attack on Russia in June of 1941, chose to follow Underground leadership rather than to submit further to the Fascist line.

Aside from such exceptions as these, French response to German victory followed personal rather than political lines.² Although some elements in the population capitulated more readily than others, no single class has borne the onus of working with the Germans. On all levels, there were cases of abject capitulation; on all levels appeared men and women capable of outstanding heroism and resistance. The Fifth Columnist, nevertheless, following a standardized pattern, flourished best where the stakes were highest.

B. Collaborationist Leaders

1. Laval. During an interview in October 1943, Andre Philip said: "Vichy's breakdown is such that the famous 'policy of collaboration' is no longer of any special interest in the German eyes." Philip went on to talk of the

1. Pierre Lazareff, Deadline, (New York, 1942), pp. 255-6.
2. No attempt will be made here, except indirectly, to indicate further economic roots of collaboration.

general panic within government circles and in the parties, and cited the large number of "changes of attitude" which have recently taken place.¹

Evidence has been abundant that collaboration breeds dissent. From the summer of 1940 on, Vichy has been characterized by internal conflicts, frequently of the greatest magnitude. One explanation of many of these conflicts is the fact that Pierre Laval cannot retain the loyalty of a large body of followers. As a symbol of collaborationism, he is as unlovely morally and politically as he is physically.

Laval in 1943 is reported to feel "isolated and subject to increasing hostility."² In contrast to the Marshal, the Chief of the Government is actively and warmly hated by a majority of the French people, "who have accepted him as a temporary evil." Many feel, however, that he has not completely sold out to the Germans, in consequence of his renowned inability to be³ thoroughly honest with anyone.

1. Interview with André Philip, French Press and Information Service, Document Série II, #206-E, 29 October 1943.
2. Press Wireless, London, 3 November 1943, from Journal de Genève, 2 November 1943.
3. CID #43600-C, 2 September 1943. Evaluation: C-0.

Since opportunism and lack of moral scruple allowed Laval to become pro-German in 1940,¹ the same traits of character might produce an about-face to the side of the Allies. There are already indications that groundwork for this change is being laid. The ex-Premier seems to be trying to create a myth about himself: the myth concerns a solitary and courageous patriot who offered to his country the only possible course of salvation and was misunderstood,² who pretended to help the Germans but was really thinking only of France,³ and who is at last in a position firmly to resist German control.

In reference to the final point, Laval recently boasted that he has just won for French workers the right of immunity from labor-conscription in Germany. This "victory" over Gauleiter Sauckel has been well-publicized.⁴ What it amounts to is the substitution of enforced labor within France for enforced labor in

1. Henry Torres, Pierre Laval, (New York, 1941), passim.
2. New York Times, 5 July 1943.
3. FCC Special Report #96, 2 October 1943.
4. FCC Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Western European Analysis #26, 28 October 1943. (This Analysis is hereinafter cited as "FCC, WEA #26".)

Germany. Military and civil orders will be distributed to industry in France, in the hope of compensating for German plants put out of production by Allied bombing.¹ It may be assumed that the actual plight of the worker² will be little improved.

Laval, left to his own devices, would probably not be a Fascist. To be sure, there are few friendly references to the United Nations in his recent comments. But it would be in keeping with his character for him even now to be building up a plump dossier to prove just how many times he has double-crossed the Germans, and precisely how firm

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1. Secret source, 8 October 1943.
 2. Despite industrial dislocation and consequent unemployment in Germany, it was in the interests of the Reich to continue the draft out of France in order to weaken the country and drain off dangerous elements. Under these circumstances, there was no reason for the draft to cease. Laval, therefore, was possibly forced to pay a price for the favor granted. (Secret Source, 20 August 1943.) Resistance and terrorism should also be mentioned as factors in persuading the Germans to alter their policy. The situation in the maquis, largely in protest of the draft, became critical during the summer of 1943. At first, the Underground had advocated submitting to the enforced labor, in order to do 5th Column work in Germany. This attitude was sharply altered: Combat's slogan became: "Partir, c'est trahir; trahir, c'est mourir." (Combat, 15 August 1943.)

a democrat he has been all along. He likes playing both ends against the middle, and is rather good at it. "On the one hand," he said in September 1943, "I would like Germany to resist, while, on the other, I have to act in such a way that Germany's power should not crush my own country."¹

While Laval may not be equal intellectually to such a man as Déat, the Chief of the Government lacks nothing in craft or plausibility. His particular temperament and aptitudes are unsuited to the strenuous discipline of Fascism. They would probably flourish best under the tolerant auspices of a preoccupied parliamentary government.

A comprehensive catalogue of Laval's enemies might serve as a roster of French politicians. Marcel Déat undertook to suggest such a list in an article entitled: "La Coalition des Mécontents."² Among the various groups cited by Déat were: the Church, which blames Laval for obligatory labor service; the Army and Navy, which remember his tradition of anti-militarism; big business, which

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1. News Digest, 4 October 1943, from Radio Vichy, 1 October 1943.
 2. Marcel Déat, "La Coalition des Mécontents", L'Oeuvre, 22-23 May 1943, OWI Digest #119.

fears his popular appeal (?) and is jealous of his prominence; pre-war trade unionists, who are disgusted with his labor-policy; and administrative officials, who distrust and envy him habitually.¹ Although Deat attacks this coalition of the discontented, the very publication of such an article tends to encourage opposition to Laval by pointing out the strength of his enemies. This should have a certain appeal for the band-wagon voter.

Deat has remained more loyal to Laval than have most collaborationists. A disagreement between them in January 1943 was well-aired in L'Oeuvre.² It concerned the question of the organization of the militia, and resulted in compromise. The argument was primarily jurisdictional, as both sides recognized the value of militia in combatting Communism, in affording aid in air-raids, and in helping to suppress insurrections.³ In a sense, the support which

1. Many trade unionists, according to the article cited in #2, ~~regell~~, prefer "to run with the wolves of big business," rather than support Laval.
2. FCC Daily, 15 January 1943; FCC Daily, 22 February 1943.
3. OSS #2512, 22 April 1943.

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Déat gives Laval is the nearest approximation of party backing to which the Chief of the Government can lay claim. For Laval is not and never has been a party leader.

Numerous alleged attempts to unseat Laval have been made during the past three years. At least two efforts at assassination were reported,¹ and several abortive plans to replace Laval politically. Among those who have come in conflict with him on the political level have been several men prominent in the Bank Worms group. For example, Jacques Benoist-Méchin, Jacques Leroy-Ladurie, Jacques Guerard, and Paul Marion, all connected with the Bank, were accused in 1942 of attempting Laval's overthrow. The details of the plot are cloudy: Laval alleged that the four mentioned were conspiring to interest Berlin in setting up a new French government to be directed by Benoist-Méchin, Doriot, and Vice-Admiral Charles Platon. After this maneuver was disclosed, Benoist-Méchin was dropped from his position as Secretary of State in charge of relations with Germany,² Guerard was shipped off to

1. Press Wireless, London, 3 November 1943, from Journal de Genève, 2 November 1943.
2. New York Times, 27 and 30 September 1942; Chicago Daily News, 29 September 1942.

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1 Portugal, Leroy-Ladurie lost his post as Minister of
 2 Agriculture, Platon was dismissed from his secretaryship,
 3 Marion was dropped from the Cabinet,⁴ and Doriot's presence
 5 on the Eastern Front was urgently requested. However
 serious the threat of conspiracy may have been, Laval
 clearly sought to reduce Doriot's power: the dismissal
 6 of PPF members and sympathizers was a step in this direction.

Laval has been instrumental in terminating the threat
 of other dissident collaborationists. Colonel François
 de la Rocque, the highly nationalistic leader of the
Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français (PSF), was
 arrested in March 1943 following a series of attacks on
 him in Action Française and Au Pilori.⁷ These papers
 8 had accused de la Rocque of being anti-Vichy. This is

1. Guerard went to Lisbon as Minister. (New York Times, 30 September 1942.)
2. Pour la Victoire, 10 October 1942. Leroy-Ladurie seems to have split with the Germans at the time of his dismissal. (Chicago Daily News, 18 September 1942.)
3. New York Times, 27 September 1942 and 19 May 1943.
4. News Digest, 15 May 1943; and New York Times, 19 May 1943.
5. FCC Daily, 11 and 22 March 1943; 17 May 1943. Also FCC Ticker, 4 and 26 August 1943.
6. OSS #16925, 18 May 1943.
7. FCC, MEA #26. It is assumed that de la Rocque's arrest and subsequent disappearance followed orders issued by Laval, as opposed to the Germans. (The name of the PSF has been changed to "Progrès Social Français.")
8. For anti-Vichy, read anti-Laval.

perfectly true, but it tells only half the story. The PSF, both before and after de la Rocque's departure, has¹ been hedging away from pure collaboration. It still uses de la Rocque's directives, and calls for absolute fidelity to Pétain, but it places no confidence in the government except as a temporary necessity. Party members are not allowed to join the SOL (militia), and the party line insists that no real collaboration is possible so long as² a single German soldier remains on French soil. M.

Letanneur, an industrialist who replaced de la Rocque as³ head of the PSF, is reported under arrest. Laval's⁴ approval has emphatically been withdrawn from the PSF.

Among others who dislike Laval are Marcel Bucard, who⁵ was arrested on his order in 1935, and Fernand de Brinon, who holds the rank of Ambassador under Vichy and restlessly⁶ seeks even more power. Bucard has been accused of com-⁷ plicity in a plot to overthrow Laval, and appears to believe that intimacy with the Germans should bring him

1. As of October 1943. (FCC, WEA #26.)
2. FCC, WEA #26.
3. Secret source, no date.
4. Le Petit Journal, formerly edited by de la Rocque, was said to have been purchased with funds provided by Laval. (See material in Western European Biographical File, OSS.)
5. FBH, Part I, p. 54.
6. France-Amerique, 31 October 1943.
7. FCC Ticker, 28 July 1943.

greater rewards than he has hitherto enjoyed. He currently advocates a federation for post-war Europe, and presumably gives Germany the dominant rôle in such a federation. With this in mind, he is willing to offer the Germans (in the name of France) a larger measure of collaboration, in return for which he would require a cessation of the victor-to-vanquished relationship.¹

De Brinon, a former journalist, took over Benoist-Méchin's place as President of the Tricolor Legion after the latter had been discredited.² As a friend and supporter of Doriot, however, de Brinon's position is precarious.³ Although from time to time he has been rumored as Laval's successor, he cannot feel especially safe in France so long as Laval is in control.⁴

Both Bucard and de Brinon express their deviation from Vichy in their tentative gestures toward Germany. Other Laval opponents have fled in the reverse direction,

1. Secret source, 20-26 June 1943.
2. FCC Daily, 15 October 1942.
3. Les Documents, 1 November 1942; FCC Ticker, 26 August 1943.
4. De Brinon was reported to have been relieved of his duties and arrested by Laval. (FCC Ticker, 28 July 1943.) This is unconfirmed. He narrowly escaped assassination on 18 October 1942. (FCC, WEA #26.)

and have been appearing, full of professed good will, in Algiers. General Jean-Marie Bergeret and Marcel Peyrouton are two examples. General Bergeret has been jailed as a traitor by the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL),¹ and M. Peyrouton, relieved of his authority² in Algeria, has been reduced to a minor post near Oran.

The trend away from Laval is also reflected in the press. Aside from such staunch supporters as L'Oeuvre (Déat) and Les Nouveaux Temps,³ few papers follow Laval's policies closely and without criticism. Some previously intransigent journals have adopted a conciliatory tone toward the enemies of Vichy. Gringoire, for example, has printed a series of articles by Raymond Recouly urging the formation of a "political 'union' from which only Communist 'Leaders' would be excluded. The Communist masses, the Socialists, and the radicals should be included, as well as the Catholic 'Popular Democrats'...." In addition, Gringoire has abandoned "political polemics", dismissed from its staff Philippe Henriot, official speaker of the

1. FCC Ticker, 26 October 1943; New York Times, 27 October 1943.
2. Peyrouton was appointed Governor General of Algeria by Giraud, 19 January 1943. He was forced to resign, 2 June 1943, and replaced by Catroux. See: M.O.I., 24 September 1943 and New York Times, 27 October 1943.
3. Jean Luchaire is Director of Les Nouveaux Temps.

French militia, and permitted the printing of fewer fanatical articles.¹ All of this is interesting since it comes at a time when Laval is attempting a resurgence of the policy of militant collaboration. It must be remembered, however, that Laval himself is playing a dual game: on one side, he preaches the beauties of French nationalism; and, on the other, he continues to court Berlin.

The Paris press accords little space to news from Vichy. Jean Luchaire, for example, seldom mentions Vichy in Les Nouveaux Temps, and, when he does, he tends to minimize the Marshal's activities and praise Laval. Le Petit Parisien devotes considerable space to criticism of the government's management of the food situation, and compresses official Vichy bulletins into small type. Both papers, however, stress items which divert attention from France's internal woes: the attention which they pay to Allied bombings is an example of this.² United Nations' strategy is, of course, a popular subject for derision in all collaborationist papers.³ News from Germany is covered with varying degrees of thoroughness.

1. FCC, WEA #26.

2. Bombing raids are covered in the style of tabloid journalism. Pictures are frequent. See, for example, both Les Nouveaux Temps and Le Petit Parisien during September 1943.

3. See: Les Nouveaux Temps, 18 and 22/23 August 1943.

The fact that Vichy itself has no positive foreign policy at the moment is reflected in the press.¹ Journalism in France, aside from the Underground papers, is marking time, awaiting a clue as to the course of future action. The extremely meagre supply of newsprint makes² taciturnity virtually obligatory.

Pierre Laval, careful student of public opinion, appears to be aware that his days as dictator are at an end. During 1943, his rare public statements have emphasized the fact that he is still a Socialist, still at heart the simple deputy, still and always a French patriot. Although expediency demands, in his opinion, closer "cooperation" with the Germans, Laval predicts an independent France after the war. In describing this brave world, the Chief of the Government is almost humble. He has antagonized, lost, or dismissed so many of his supporters that humility becomes him.³

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1. Press Wireless, London, 3 November 1943.
 2. Only a few favored papers, such as L'Oeuvre and Les Nouveaux Temps, receive a paper supply sufficiently large to permit actual political commentary.
 3. New York Times, 5 July 1943; FCC Special Report #96, 2 October 1943; News Digest, 4 October 1943, from Radio Vichy, 1 October 1943; Plain Cable, Bern, 13 October 1943.

2. Déat. Among the ranks of collaboration, Marcel Déat stands out not only as a comparatively loyal adherent of Laval, but also as one of the few Vichyites gifted with any measure of intellectual distinction.¹ The two characteristics are reconciled by the fact that Déat has a native inclination for the rigors of Fascist doctrine.² His long-term devotion to national socialist principles³ appears to outweigh his personal regard for Laval.

In pre-war France, Déat turned his attention primarily to politics and journalism. Elected as a deputy, he soon showed that he lacked neither convictions nor enemies.⁴ He frequently displayed a talent for backing political horses at the moment when they were losing the race. Déat

1. Déat, former student at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and agrégé de philosophie, early showed the qualities of brilliance and undependability which later marked him. (Andre Sidobre, La Marseillaise, 16 May 1943.)
2. As was suggested above, Laval has no such instinctive enthusiasm for Fascism.
3. Déat's Socialism before 1939 bore many Nazi traces, but differed in important respects from German National Socialism. (Example: Déat signed a manifesto before the war urging the Polish government to be less anti-Semitic. As a Socialist rabble-rouser, Déat was effective. (See: Franck, op. cit.; Sidobre, op. cit.; and material in Western European Biographical File, OSS.)
4. Sidobre, op. cit.

thus managed to approve a union of the left when the Popular Front no longer existed, and to oppose the Communists¹ at the hour of their greatest strength. In the space of six and one half years, he represented three constituencies in the Chamber, being elected sometimes by the left, sometimes by the far left, and sometimes by the right.² Although his undoubted abilities could muster momentary support, he could not maintain loyalty.

Such a situation might discourage a sensitive man. Déat, on the contrary, became increasingly contemptuous of popular intelligence, and increasingly sure of his own destiny. The Third Republic, in doing him few favors, convinced him of the weakness of parliamentary government.

Déat's enthusiasm for World War II was slight. From the time he published in L'Oeuvre his famous editorial:³ "Why Die for Danzig?" until the actual day of defeat, his patriotism was just warm enough to keep him out of jail. He became a collaborationist the morning after France

1. La France Libre, I, January 1941.

2. Sidobre, op. cit.

3. See: Alexander Werth, Twilight of France, (New York, 1942), p.340. Werth gives May 1939 as the date of publication of this editorial.

fell.¹

Déat, therefore, in order to attain a non-Marxian Socialist Europe, organized along national and authoritarian lines, had become first an appeaser, then a lukewarm patriot, and, finally, the intellectual leader of collaborationism.

Déat the collaborationist has used two main channels of expression: L'Oeuvre, the paper which he directs, and the Rassemblement National Populaire (RNP),² the party of which he is founder and leader. Through both channels, he has preached the gospel of National Socialism, and attacked the hesitancy and weakness of Vichy.³ Pétain he has criticized often, and the administration in general even

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1. Déat wrote at this time: "It matters little to us whether England resists a month, a year, or ten years: the fate of the continent has been sealed by the victory of Flanders." Collaboration with the Germans was therefore inevitable, he went on, and potentially profitable to France. "To reserve jealously the independence and sovereignty of the nation if that reservation will cost us the annexation of several provinces and the reduction of a diminished France to impotence would be a false calculation." (La France Libre, I, January 1941.) This argument was persuasive. It appealed to the tired, the disgusted, the disillusioned, the anti-British. At least for awhile, the Germans appeared to represent calm and stability.
 2. Founded 1 February 1941, as a counter-move to Vichy's Rassemblement National.
 3. See, for example; Christian Science Monitor, 28 November 1941; New York Herald Tribune, 16 January 1942.

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more frequently. "The whole administration," he wrote recently, "is riddled with men who hate Laval and Pétain,¹ or who refuse to obey the Government's orders." His own attitude, at least in regard to the Marshal, is scarcely one of unquestioning obedience, but such distinctions do not bother him.

L'Oeuvre is a violently pro-German newspaper. Ostensibly financed by Nazi interests, and receiving a generous allotment of paper from German officials,² the journal is the semi-official organ of the RNP. Its basic thesis is that Nazi Germany is the "rampart of Europe",³ and that collaboration is, ipso facto, virtuous. In spite of this policy, Déat manages to support Laval even when the Chief of the Government is distinctly unpopular in Berlin.⁴

The RNP ^rstands ~~of~~ falls with Franco-German collaboration. Insofar as foreign affairs are concerned, it scorns internationalism and advocates a European bloc, with Germany and France favored. In the field of domestic policy,

1. FCC Daily, 25 October 1943.
2. CID #44104-R, August 1943.
3. L'Oeuvre, 30 July 1943.
4. See #3, page 22.

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the RNP, under Déat's guidance, desires a strong state, but one that will guard with an almost paternal eye such individual and communal liberties as are compatible with totalitarianism.¹ Déat remains radical in the sense that he distrusts large financial interests, and fears the power of the Church.² He has criticized severely the reaction and clericalism of Vichy.³

Déat the Socialist is not particularly well-versed in practical economics. Despite his contention that economic organization is the fundamental problem of any state, his own economic convictions are by no means perfectly attuned to his political ideas.⁴ To adjust his particular brand of socialism to the demands of German Fascism was not, perhaps, a difficult task, although he remains ideologically somewhat to the left of dominant Nazi theory. To advocate, however, as Déat continues to do, a corporative economy that will be free from state domination is a more delicate operation.⁵ In addition, Déat from time to time pays lip-service to the concept of popular government. A recent comment in L'Oeuvre illustrates this mélange:

1. FBI, Part III, p. 107. See also: FCC Daily, 28 June 1943 and 27 September 1943.
2. Christian Science Monitor, 28 November 1941; Pro Deo Correspondence, vol. II, #7, 3 April 1943.
3. FCC Daily, 27 September 1943.
4. La France Libre, I, January 1941.
5. FBI, Part III, p. 107.

There are ways of directing the economy of the nation without upsetting consciences and without destroying traditions too rapidly. Public Enemy No. 1 can be named. It is the Trusts, hidden in the new Comités d'Organization; and to overcome these, as we have said so many times, a strong state is needed. Apparently everybody is unanimous about this, as we see in the...reports of the Conseil Supérieur de l'Economie, the idea of this kind of State suggested. But the State is not enough. Its linking up with the popular masses is necessary.¹

Consistent with Déat's Socialism is his attitude toward members of the Bank Worms group. Although he has supported certain members of this group at rare intervals,² a list of those with whom he has come in conflict includes a large percentage of prominent financiers and industrialists. Doriot's party, the Parti Populaire Français (PPF),³ contains a greater number of Bank Worms members than does the RNP.⁴ It might also be mentioned that the PPF has a larger underworld following.

The main sign of uneasiness which Déat has shown lately is in respect to calling the National Assembly. For many collaborationists, the convocation of a Consultative Assembly by the French Committee of National

1. News Digest, 6 October 1943, from L'Oeuvre (North Zone), 4 October 1943.
2. Pierre Pucheu is an example. (See Worms et Cie., cited above, #2, Page 4.)
3. Founded in 1936.
4. Prominent in the PPF have been such figures as Barnaud, Leroy-Ladurie, etc. (See Worms et Cie., cited above, #2.)

Liberation in Algiers served both as warning and suggestion. Déat and Laval, anxious over possible repercussions in France, have suggested calling the National Assembly, in order, obviously, to give a semblance of legality to the Vichy government.¹ Déat, suddenly zealous in protection of legislative rights, has stressed that the Assembly was never dissolved, and has added that the new National Militia could be used to implement the power of the reassembled government. So far (December 1943), the proposal remains in the paper stage.

Déat's nationalism is unchanging in its scorn of Vichy's weakness, and de Gaulle's "betrayal." Because he has always espoused lost causes with a rare and morbid enthusiasm,² Déat might well go down fighting for the principles of Fascism. Since he is psychologically fitted to be an extremist, Fascism suits his disposition better than democracy ever could. He would be an astonishing and dangerous supporter of the United Nations should he attempt to make that unlikely switch.

For Déat, like Laval, cannot command popular allegiance: the RNP itself shows no conspicuous loyalty. His effect has been characteristically to divide and slatter

1. News Digest, 29 September 1943, from Lya Dagligt Allehanda, 24 September 1943
2. La Marseillaise, 16 May 1943.

rather than unite or build. Since he has rarely paid any heed to the currents of public opinion, he cannot serve as a reliable thermometer to the political temperature of France. He is, rather a culture of the virus which has infected the country.

Déat's maximum utility, therefore, appears to lie in his gift for turning Frenchman against Frenchman, for creating suspicion, discord, and distrust. As a negative weapon in the psychological process of softening France for invasion, he is unintentionally playing on the side of the United Nations.

3. Pétain. The eddies of Vichy bickering continue to wash around the virtually moribund figure of Marshal Philippe Pétain. In a letter written in October 1943 to Raymond Lachal of the Legion des Combattants, the Chief of State declaimed: "It is the future that I am preparing. The present régime, due to circumstances, cannot represent in advance the one that I intend to establish which will allow the liberties we cherish to bloom harmoniously."¹ Evidently feeling that liberties cannot "bloom harmoniously" in the presence of Pierre Laval, the Marshal is reported to wish his dismissal. He claims that he was "forced to use" Laval,

1. FCC, WEA #26.

but feels his utility to have vanished. Nevertheless, despite Pétain's distaste for his colleague and Laval's lack of admiration for the Marshal, each is too useful to the other to be dispensed with for the time being. Mutually distrustful, they are reported to have been sending out separate feelers in the direction of the Allies.¹ Neither one has the makings of a bitter-ender; each would like to play a part in post-war France.

Pétain's popularity has suffered a sea-change within the past three years. The hero of World War I dwindles into the pawn of World War II. To be sure, one recent report asserts hopefully that the Marshal is now more popular than ever before, but the source is unreliable.² Another and more likely account states that Pétain's popularity is rapidly approaching absolute zero.³ Criticism of his administration is surely on the increase, and the

1. OSS R & A Report #1125, 31 August 1943.
2. Secret source, no date.
3. Secret source, 25 August 1943.

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oft-attempted distinction between the Marshal and his¹
government is not impressive.

Both Laval and Pétain are preparing for the possibility of a German defeat. Aside from trying to make a favorable impression on the Allies, they are already preparing shelter in neutral countries in the event of enforced flight. Laval and his followers (such as Déat and de Brinon) are said to favor Switzerland as their refuge. They have funds awaiting them there, and can make use of the facilities of the Banque National de Commerce et Industrie. Pétain's supporters appear to prefer the climate of the Iberian peninsula. Jacques Guerard and Banque Worms associates have reputedly worked out plans for a Pétainist haven in Lisbon.²

As Vichy prestige recedes day by day, critics emerge on all sides. Radio Paris recently described the state of French opinion in the following words:

1. Secret Source, no date.
2. Paul Winkler in Washington Post, November 1943. This account not verified, although the information about Guerard has appeared before. As Minister to Portugal (now replaced), Guerard's alleged primary function was to make funds available to Vichy if the need should arise. (COB Airgram 137, 8 June 1943, Treasury Air 8- Confidential.)

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Everywhere in France voices are heard lamenting the plight of our country, denouncing a National Revolution which is becoming a cruel mockery, expressing the indignation of French militant National Socialists.... Everywhere, what was to be the very foundation of the New Order is sliding toward anarchy....To indict the responsible would be, if not untimely, at least useless. Everybody knows that they are the men who in July 1940 suddenly arose to posts of command, and have in thirty months managed to hand over our Empire, betray Europe and besmirch our honor. They are the same people who, behind the Marshal, have pretended to proclaim the necessity for regenerating France and have taken the lead in the regeneration movement in order to ensure its failure. They have systematically sabotaged our every chance to declare ourselves on the side of the continental countries.¹

This warning comes rather late, if the situation is as serious as the quotation suggests. It is well to remember, however, that it is in the interests of the Germans and the most ardent collaborationists to have the Allies believe that France is on the verge of collapse.

Other critics of Vichy point specifically to the administrative machine established in the past three years as primary source of most of the current disaster.

Anatole de Monzie, former parliamentarian, in his latest book, La Saison des Juges,² dissects Vichy with little mercy. Although the book was banned by the government, it is, nevertheless, prominently displayed in French bookstores, and has been reviewed in several papers,³ notably Action Francaise. The Riom trial is an object of

1. News Digest, 13 October 1943, from Radio Paris, 11 October 1943.

2. FCC, WEA #26.

3. Press Intelligence, Whiteside, Geneva, 21 October 1943.

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de Monzie's particular attack. So far as can be judged, the author's intent in writing such a book at this time was to regain the favor of former colleagues in parliament, whom he had chastized severely in two previous volumes.¹ The timing of publication (late 1943) is an interesting point.²

Clues as to Pétain's octogenarian ambitions have been distributed freely in newspapers, on the radio, and through other channels of information. Some reports emanate from France to the effect that the Marshal is the last repository of French liberties, and that collaboration as he practises it is the only method of combatting pure German domination. This school of thought pictures the Marshal as a "sly old fox", who has far more authority than is realized and who makes a regular practice of outwitting Germans.³ There is no proof of any such thing. Berlin appears to be trying to place on French shoulders the responsibility of suppressing sabotage and revolt.

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1. Petition pour l'Histoire and Ci-Devant.
 2. Laval is also engaged in currying parliamentary favor. He is reported to desire a meeting of parliamentary collaborationists, to counteract the Assembly in Algiers, and to give a semblance of legitimacy to his régime. (France, 29 October 1943.)
 3. OSS #23779, 23 October 1943.

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Creating the illusion of an independent Vichy accords with this policy.

The involved story of Pétain's supposed resignation¹ is another aspect of the same attempt. The Germans, however, in spinning this complicated web of rumor and report, have fallen victim to their own imagination. For if Pétain were as clever as they sometimes picture him, and if he had the popular backing which they often attribute to him, he would assuredly be able to put up a better showing. The scenario is too elaborate for the principal actor.

There are, nevertheless, reports coming from non-German sources to the effect that Pétain will actually undertake a volte face when circumstances are more favorable.² If this should happen, it would not prove that the Marshal is a democrat, or even an anti-Fascist. It would³ mean simply that the Germans were rapidly losing the war.

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1. FCC Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Special Report #102, 22 November 1943.
 2. FCC, WEA #26.
 3. Pertinax alleges, without confirmation, that Pétain was nearly persuaded to leave for North Africa with General Georges in May 1943, but finally refused on the grounds that the trip would be too strenuous. (New York Times, 29 October 1943.)

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In line with this theory is a report from a reliable source which claims that Pétain has determined to transfer all authority to the FCNL in Algiers, and is merely seeking the best method of accomplishing this. The purpose of such a scheme, according to the informant, would be to establish the legitimacy of Vichy on the grounds that only a legitimate government could transfer the authority of the state. The FCNL¹ would then be left to make an extremely delicate choice.

4. Doriot. The friction between Laval and Pétain has been reflected among their henchmen. Déat, siding with Laval, is rarely in harmony with Doriot, who supports the Marshal.² The two party leaders are dissimilar in most respects, since Doriot has the subtlety of a finger-man in a murder-ring. Their parties draw from different social and academic levels: the RNP (Déat) appealing to the more thoughtful of collaborationists; the PPF (Doriot) embracing a large percentage of criminals and strong-arm boys. The PPF, in fact, might better be termed a gang than a party.

1. Secret source, OSS. The account went on to state that Laval knows nothing of Pétain's intentions.
2. It should be emphasized here that the network of collaborationist relationships is infinitely complicated, and subject to change without notice. (See above, on Laval and Déat.)

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Laval's support of Déat¹ has encouraged Doriot in opposition to Vichy. The PPF at the outset appeared to have an advantage over the RNP. The former was founded well before the defeat as a movement of revolt against those forces which were weakening France. It had a fairly large membership in all zones. And its anti-intellectual bias had a definite popular appeal. The RNP, on the other hand, was not founded until 1941, was restricted to Paris and its environs, and customarily dealt in propaganda on a more sophisticated level than that of the PPF.²

In addition to these advantages, the PPF could count on active German support. This fact was illustrated by Laval's alleged inability to dissolve the party when he desired to do so. Hitler refused to permit it.³ Doriot's lack of independence in thinking, his avowed preference for dictatorial methods, and his willingness to execute German orders make him an excellent tool for the Nazis. He is less intelligent than Déat, and consequently less dangerous.⁴ During the summer and autumn of 1943, he was frequently rumored to be Berlin's first choice as a successor to Laval.⁵

1. Which resulted in the dismissal in 1942 of the numerous PPF adherents mentioned above.
2. Le Pays Reel, 3 November 1942.
3. Combat, 1 June 1943.
4. Rapport Politique, 22 June 1942.
5. New York Times, 27 July 1943.

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Doriot's whereabouts lately have been rather obscure.¹
 In March, he was reported on his way to the Eastern Front;
 ten days later, was said to have volunteered to direct the
 pacification of the Upper Savoy;² for several weeks, he was
 not mentioned in the ^{Paris} press at all, although Underground
 sources asserted he had been put away;³ in early August,
 he was "back from the Eastern Front";⁴ and at the end
 of August, he was received by de Brinon "before he left
 for the Eastern Front."⁵ In October, he was reputedly on
 his way to Berlin to see Himmler.⁶

The Parti Populaire Français which, according to La
Marseillaise, is neither French nor popular,⁷ has suffered
 from lack of Vichy support.⁸ Its treasury is depleted.

1. FCC Daily, 11 March 1943.
2. FCC Daily, 22 March 1943. The account went on to state that Doriot was not "permitted" to go to the Eastern Front.
3. FCC Daily, 17 May 1943.
4. FCC Ticker, 4 August 1943. (He was probably in Russia from April to August.)
5. FCC Ticker, 26 August 1943.
6. Secret source, 20 October 1943. Evaluation C-0.
7. La Marseillaise, 25 October 1942.
8. Secret source, 20-26 June 1943.

A Swiss report states that at present the movement "hardly plays any rôle as (a) political party."¹ Doriot, recently defeated by Laval on the question of paramilitary organizations, apparently has suffered another setback in the Sauckel decision to suspend labor deportations.² The PPF, through Doriot's paper, Le Cri du Peuple, had loudly advocated the draft, and criticized Vichy for laxness in enforcing it. PPF members had been active in attempting to clear the maquis.³ In one sense, therefore, the suspension of the draft amounts to German support for Laval, and "an unmistakable disavowal of Doriot."⁴

Doriot is as combative as Déat, although less gifted in invective. Among the squabbles in which Doriot has found himself was one with Eugene Deloncle, former head of the Mouvement Social Revolutionnaire (MSR) and ex-Cagouillard leader.⁵ Deloncle, disabused as to the certainty of a German victory, resigned control of the MSR in May 1942,⁶ several months after his break with Doriot was reported.

1. Plain cable, Bern, 13 October 1943. (PPF membership reached a peak of 1,000,000 in its heyday.)
2. Secret cable, OSS, 31 October 1943. Laval, fearing the potential danger of a single strong militia, has encouraged the formation of several militias and elites. The PPF has been infiltrating into at least two of the militias, and objects to the competition which Laval is sponsoring.
3. See above, pp. 9-10.
4. National Zeitung (Swiss), quoted in secret source, 7 November 1943.
5. FEH, Part III, p. 111. Also: material in Western European Biographical Files, OSS.
6. See #5 above. Fontenoy probably replaced Deloncle in the MSR. (Deloncle had helped Déat found the RNP.)

Within the tangled mesh of Vichy antagonisms runs the thread of monarchist opinion. Charles Maurras, head of Action Française and "spiritual leader of the Royalists,"¹ has frequently come in conflict with Laval and Déat. Maurras, an extreme nationalist often charged with "Germanophobia", has long been an active supporter and friend of Pétain, taking the Marshal's side in his numerous controversies with Laval. The particular Utopia of Maurras is a Latin civilization from which all outside influences such as England, Germany, and the United States would be excluded.² As a party, however, Action Française now amounts to little more than a debating society, and does not try to influence actual policy. It prefers to act as a nucleus for political argument rather than as a pressure group. In this way, it hopes to survive in the post-war world.³

The controversy of Déat and Maurras has been particularly heated. Déat has used L'Oeuvre as his weapon for attacking Maurras;⁴ Maurras uses the publication Action Française.⁵ René Martel entered the argument at one point.

1. New York Times, 19 November 1941
2. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5 May 1943.
3. Secret source, OSS, 17 October 1943.
4. Propanal, Paris, 30 October 1943.
5. FCC Ticker, 21 October 1943. Circulation in South Zone reported as 25,000.

criticizing Maurras "not for having polluted French youth, not for hatred of our neighbors, not for the Latin bloc, but for having sabotaged our entente with Europe and having furthered dissidence in North Africa -- this is an open secret."¹

No aspect of these arguments serves to strengthen French unity or further the cause of collaboration.

C. Disaffection

1. Terrorism, Fugitives. The contagion of disaffection is spreading in France. Doriot, in an address to the central committee of the PPF in Paris went so far as to blame the Germans for the failure of collaboration, saying: "I have no intention at the present moment to continue my task of promoting Franco-German collaboration. I abandon this task and will in the future only remain a soldier of the anti-Bolshev legion."² Underground and FCNL papers stress the panic³ in Vichy.

Aside from the long-standing anti-Germanism of Action Française, there have been other violent attacks on close collaboration in recent months. Aujourd'hui wrote in

1. News Digest, 29 September 1943, from Paris Soir (North Zone), 8 September 1943.
2. FCC Daily, 26 February 1943. Evidence here contradicts other reports that Doriot has continued to support the Germans.
3. See, for example, Libération, 1 and 15 August 1943.

September:

The ebb and flow of the tide of battles between the armies that face each other has, obviously repercussions on public opinion and in particular upon those former republican adherents for whom any opportunity is good enough if it will bring them back into power and allow them to resume their successful little combines. They can find nothing better to do than to use their government as a sort of barometer for victory. When Germany advances, Vichy proclaims itself authoritarian. When Germany retreats, Vichy is democratic. Not since the days of our distant ancestor the chimpanzee has the art of imitation reached such a degree of perfection. In order to court the eventual victor, France has been providentially furnished with a transformation system. It is not a régime, it is an impersonation act.¹

Neither the FCNL itself nor the United Nations in concert could do much better than this.

The arrest of de la Rocque, the reception of de Monzie's book, the rumors about Pétain, and the abortive attempts of such men as Charles Spinasse to join resistance groups have fanned the already sturdy fires of the dissidents.² Estimates of pro-Vichy sentiment vary in emphasis, but most of them point in the same direction. Franco-German

1. News Digest, 29 September 1943, from Aujourd'hui (North Zone) 7 September 1943.

2. Spinasse, former Socialist leader and cabinet member, became Pétainist and pro-German. When he tried to join resistance groups, he was reported to have been rejected. (France-Amérique, 6 June 1943.)

1

collaboration is no longer a going concern.

Active revolt within France is already a reality. Infrequent acts of sabotage are giving way to systematic destruction. Attacks by Guerilla bands in the Haute Savoie can no longer be dismissed as sporadic outbursts.

Paul Creyssel in an appeal to the guerillas was reduced to the following argument: if you (guerillas) must carry out your civilian vengeance, wait until France no longer plays host to the Germans; you may win against peasants with pitchforks, but you will be lost against German force. "Your guardian government...has acquired the means of delaying the hour when your blood will have to be shed."

2

Wages, lagging far behind prices, have given impetus to strikes, and to theft as well.³ Stealing

1. Evidence on this point: (a) A "majority" of Frenchmen refuse to follow Vichy. (Nouveaux Temps (North Zone), 3 September 1943); (b) "Defeat has taught nothing to two-thirds of France." (L'Oeuvre (North Zone), 3 September 1943); (c) "90% of our compatriots are by no means disposed to allow themselves to be Bolshevized." (Paris Soir (North Zone) 3 September 1943); (d) 70% of France is Gaullist; 20% is Communist; 10% is pro-Vichy or wavering. (Le Peuple (Genève) 7 October 1943); (e) 95% of Marseilles is pro-Giraud and de Gaulle (Secret source, 7 August 1943).
2. FCC, WEA #26.
3. Attempts have been made to avoid inflation, but with little success. Such goods as may be obtained are offered at prohibitive prices. The black market has become an institution of occupied France. (See #2 above.)

from Germans or collaborationists has an ethical sanction. The task of keeping the peace has become practically impossible. Collaborationist newspapers have been quoting cases of gendarmes in the maquis who warn intended victims¹ the night before they plan to arrest them. Officials guarding the Spanish frontier are supplied with civilian clothes, some say to be able to get across into Spain when defeat comes.² The Germans in Lescar (near Pau) have been rounding up members of the Chantiers de Jeunesse and searching their meeting-places for concealed weapons and munitions.³ An intercepted letter from a member of the Guard Mobile to his family states that the writer can no longer continue the "bestial life" of working for the Germans. He says that this is the general attitude of the Guard.⁴ Railroad accidents have become so common that every German train in the Savoie is preceded by a passenger train which acts as a hostage.⁵ The Italian collapse served⁶ as a precipitant for all types of sabotage and terrorism.

1. Secret source, 20-26 September 1943.
2. Secret source, 20 October 1943.
3. Secret source, 20 October 1943.
4. Secret source, Summer 1943.
5. News Digest, 26 October 1943, from Tribune de Genève, 21 October 1943.
6. Press Intelligence, Whiteside, Stockholm, 22 October 1943.

"(The) French situation seems increasingly explosive with approaching breakdown of 'law and order' and public approval of patriots."¹

A serious danger is that Allied propaganda may provoke premature revolt on an even larger scale. This is, of course, desired by the Germans, since, in this way, Allied sympathizers may be detected and eliminated in advance of invasion. Once the expectation of invasion has been aroused to any considerable degree, each day's delay turns away or otherwise renders impotent sources of United Nations support.

Aside from actual terrorism, another impressive symptom of the decline of the Reich is the epidemic of hasty departures from France. Portugal shelters a few of the disillusioned.² Yves Chatel is there,³ and Nogues, too. It would be distinctly unhealthy for them to return to North Africa, and Vichy France considers them traitors. Others

1. Propanal, Whiteside, 21 October 1943.
2. Chatel, former Governor General of Algeria, was retired by the FCNL. (New York Times, 27 October 1943.)
3. General August Nogues, former French General Resident in Morocco, was responsible for about 75% of Anglo-American losses in the landings in November 1942. (New York Times, 27 October 1943.)

who have fled to England and North Africa have been given slightly warmer receptions. Charles Vallin is an example of this, ¹ as are Giraud, ² Flandin, ³ Bergeret, ⁴ Pucheu, ⁵ and ⁶ Georges. Their utility for the Fighting French and the Allies has varied. The FCNL has been notably unenthusiastic about most of them. Darlan's fate, however, has not been ⁷ shared.

London and Algiers have not been the only places of ⁸ refuge. Paul Marion escaped "by a miracle" to Switzerland.

1. Vallin, former vice-president of the Croix de Feu, and the RSF, fled to join de Gaulle in September 1942. (New York Herald Tribune, 1 October 1943.)
2. General Henri Giraud arrived in North Africa in November 1942; was removed from FCNL in November 1943. (Washington Post, 10 November 1943.)
3. Former Premier Pierre-Etienne Flandin is now in Morocco, under surveillance. M.O.I., 24 September 1943 and New York Times, 27 October 1943.
4. General Jean-Marie Bergeret, appointed Assistant High Commissioner for North Africa by Darlan, chosen as Commander in Chief of the Air Force in French West Africa by Giraud, is now under arrest as a traitor, by order of the FCNL. (New York Times, 27 October 1943.)
5. Pierre Pucheu, former Vichy minister, reached Africa in May 1943, was jailed in mid-August in Morocco, and has yet to be tried. (New York Times, 27 October 1943.)
6. General Alphonse Georges, who escaped to North Africa in May 1943, was appointed minister without portfolio in the FCNL (June 1943) and ousted from Committee in November 1943. (Washington Post, 10 November 1943.)
7. The assassination of Admiral Darlan took place on December 24, 1942.
8. Paul Marion, Vichy propaganda minister charged with complicity in several plots, escaped to Geneva in May 1943. (OSS #16925, 18 May 1943.)

Leroy-Ladurie proceeded to Germany, under arrest.¹ Doriot
 at least contemplated going to the Eastern Front.² Benoist-
 Mechin³ and Brasillach⁴ simply disappeared. De la Rocque's⁵
 place of captivity has not been disclosed.

These changes of heart, whether voluntary or enforced, invite scrutiny. The time and conditions of departure must be taken into account in each case, as well as the record of the individual since June 1940. Any American or British landing in France will uncover, at least at the outset, many collaborationists actively protesting loyalty to the principles of democracy. The French themselves will in many instances be the ones to determine the accuracy of such protestations.

1. Jacques Leroy-Ladurie, briefly Minister of Agriculture under Vichy, was arrested and sent to Germany for having "concealed Jewish funds and sent capital to North Africa." (FCC Ticker, 26 August 1943.)
2. See p. 35 #1 to #6.
3. Jacques Benoist-Méchin, follower of Doriot, and Marion's assistant, was reported to have fled France in May 1943. (New York Times, 19 May 1943.) A meeting at his house in November 1943 presumably discussed the constitution of a new government, and proposed Francois Pietri as President. Platon, with whom Benoist-Méchin was involved in a plot in 1942, is cited as the chief power behind the plan. (Secret source, OSS, 23 November 1943.)
4. The disappearance of Robert Brasillach, editor of Je Suis Partout, has caused comment. "Is it due to internal troubles among previously homogenous team of ex-Maurrasians who supported every dictatorship? Or is it (the) prudent withdrawal of exposedest (sic) leader? Second hypothesis generally adopted by public opinion." (Press Intelligence, Geneva, 12 October 1943.)
5. Colonel Francois de la Rocque was arrested in March 1943. (FCC Daily, 17 March 1943.)

However sincere pro-Allied conversions may be, they are surely an excellent indication of the state of French morale. The collaborationist, as of December 1943, is filled with a sense of foreboding. And with reason.

2. General. Under the stimulus of prolonged association with the Germans and their hirelings, the French have lost the indifference and despair which characterized them in 1940, and have gained hatred, national pride, and a desire for revenge. The fall of Italy sharpened resistance in France: officers formerly dismissed have been reinstated; the undermining process has been accelerated; and the shoddy mask of collaboration has ripped in many places to disclose violent national sympathies. France is preparing another¹ revolution.

The strain of German friendship is apparent in many quarters. "It is said that about 400,000 persons are kept in prisons and concentration camps, whereas 35,000 death sentences (have been) executed."² The Underground press predicted the replacement of Laval by a triumvirate of Déat, Doriot and Bucard (an unlikely suggestion), or

1. Press Intelligence, Whiteside, Stockholm, 22 October 1943.
2. Secret source, 16 August 1943, from "Reliable Polish Source (B-2)".

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by de Brinon and Bonnet.¹ Shortly after this suggestion was made, de Brinon narrowly escaped assassination,² as Capron had done a few months before.³ Laval appointees to posts in Switzerland have shown signs of turning chameleon: among them are the Ambassador, Admiral Bard,⁴ and Dumoulin de la Barthète, financial attaché in Bern. Plans for a single party along Fascist lines failed because the two zones have never merged, and because of the rivalry of numerous factions.⁵ The Church, although officially considering Pétain's the only legitimate government, and admittedly apprehensive over popular revolution and communist ambitions,⁶ must be aware of the fact that parish priests have become increasingly active on the side of anti-fascism.⁷ "Optimism in 1943 does not imply the certainty of a German victory," remarked Je Suis Partout with a measure of ambiguity.⁸

1. Liberation, 15 August 1943.
2. FCC, VEA #26.
3. News Digest, 13 April 1943.
4. Bir Hakeim, June-July 1943.
5. Plain cable, Bern, 13 October 1943. See also News Digest, 26 October 1943.
6. Radio Paris, 15 October 1943, reporting (alleged) decision of Assemblée Générale of cardinals and bishops.
7. One account illustrative of this may be found in secret source, date of origin July 1943. See also secret source, no date.
8. News Digest, 2 October 1943, from Je Suis Partout (North Zone) 10 September 1943.

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And this is by no means all. A prefect's report admits that: "It is a fact that the campaigns of the press of the radio against the bolshevist danger get only a poor reception."¹ A cable from Bern in October describes the prevailing attitude in France as a combination of "international Communism, nationalism, and pro-British sentiment,"² all of which make active collaboration a virtual impossibility. Max Bonnafous, Secretary of State for Agriculture and Food Supply, admits that the government dare not crack down on black market operations for fear that the prefects would be unable to curb the inevitable unrest that would follow.³ Pierre Laval, understandably alarmed at the thought of assassination, publicizes the information that his car now bears the colors of Auvergne. According to a dispatch in the New York Times, this patriotic display is in the interest of security a car in the entourage of Laval is actually so equipped, but it is not the car⁴ in which Laval rides.

1. Secret source, no date.
2. Plain Cable, Bern, 13 October 1943.
3. FCC, WEA #26
4. New York Times, 12 November 1943.

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The one-way traffic from Vichy to the side of the Allies is a disquieting thought for the residual collaborationist. The transition has in many cases proved fairly simple. Raoul Roussy de Sales gave one explanation when he wrote: "...what has been called Pétain mysticism is an unhealthy form of nationalism. Thus, there has been a realignment of forces, a shift toward de Gaulle, in whom both the chauvinistic tendencies and Pétain mysticism¹ have been centered."

That there has been no simultaneous welling of sympathy for the United Nations within collaborationist France is not unexpected. Many undoubtedly share Laval's feelings when he was reported to have said: "To hell with America!² But of course with the usual reservations." Few things could be worse for France than to have "Mr. X," the key figure of the country after the war, a man tainted with any degree of German collaboration. No one who has lived, however precariously, on German support between 1940 and the end of the war can look forward to the grateful appreciation of his country.

1. Raoul Roussy de Sales, "The Making of Yesterday," Atlantic Monthly, November 1943.
2. New York Times, 5 July 1943.

III. CONCLUSION

The most significant fact that emerges from a study of the current political and ideological temper of France is that occupation has bred dissidence, that dissidence has bred conflict among the Vichy leaders, and that this conflict can easily be turned into more active revolt along nationalistic lines. This revolt will most probably be led not by the French now outside of France,¹ not by the discredited followers of Vichy or the Germans, and not by United Nations leaders meeting in conference.² The effort to free France will be a popular one, with Underground direction. A valuable task for the United Nations at present would be to attempt to weaken and scatter as much as possible the opposition which these French patriots will inevitably encounter.

Unless there is literally to be no France after the war, she must attain a measure of political coalescence and stability outside the meagre framework of collaboration. Fortunately for her sake, France is traditionally unable to suffer Germans gladly. The noisier Germanophiles are few

1. The obvious qualification here would be in respect to de Gaulle.
2. The limited recognition granted the FOML and the failure of the Moscow Conference (October-November 1943) to include France on the European Advisory Commission have given ammunition to anti-Allied forces in France.

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in number; and if they persist in their support of the Nazis, their loss will be one the country can afford to bear. As for the others, the road of recantation will not be easy. The Underground have long memories.

During the remaining months of the war in Europe, conflicts between the Germans and their French adherents, and between the French themselves, will of necessity increase, and the resultant friction may be used as a measure of French "softening." It should not be forgotten, however, that no matter how useful intra-French controversy may be for United Nations strategy now, it is bound to have serious post-war implications.

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